by Alexander B. Joy

[An idyllic English village. Sunlight dapples cobblestone streets that wind unhurriedly past low stone buildings and green fields. By contrast, busy VILLAGERS bustle at diverse labors, industrious but clearly flagging. From the town hall stumbles the philosopher JEREMY BENTHAM, looking dazed and haggard.]
BENTHAM: Egad! I did indeed pray for a swift escape from my sufferings, but I could have done with some warning as to when they’d be answered! Being whisked such a great distance, and at such blinding speed, could be mistaken for yet another inventive torture. Ugh—
[He retches in a nearby hedge. Passers-by study him with concern.]
FIRST VILLAGER: This man needs help!
SECOND VILLAGER: Let’s give him an anti-emetic. Where’s the pharmacist?
[The onlookers produce a man in a white coat.]
PHARMACIST: Apologies. Nausea medication must all go to the sailors, for whom it will do the most good. This gentleman will be sick for only a short time, whereas nausea is the common lot of our seafarers.
THIRD VILLAGER: That settles it. Carry on, everybody!
[The crowd disperses to their various preoccupations. Bentham surfaces from the hedge.]
BENTHAM: Where am I? And why does everyone appear so tired? These surroundings rather resemble Derry Hill – the village near Bowood House, where I spent many a youthful day at my patron Lord Lansdowne’s invitation. But surely I’ve not been carried back into the past?
[A weary male voice of familiar timbre reaches Bentham from afar.]
FAMILIAR VOICE: No, dear friend. This is the present – and, if all proceeds as designed, your future.
BENTHAM: Hark! Could it be—?
[He finds JOHN STUART MILL, the utilitarian philosopher, straining to flatten lemons in a press. The juice flows into an odd contraption that dispenses glasses of iced lemonade, which villagers intermittently snatch.]
BENTHAM: Mill, my boy! After what I’ve been through, the pleasure I feel upon seeing you verges on indescribable.
[Mill pauses his work, wiping sweat from his brow. The two men embrace, though both are unsteady on their feet.]
MILL: I’m glad to hear it, Bentham. But pardon me if I say that I hope it’s the least happiness you experience here. With any luck, your stay will involve pleasures of an even higher order.
[He returns to his lemonade press.]
BENTHAM: A higher order? What do you mean by that, my boy?
MILL: Oh, I’d forgotten that you passed away long before I published Utilitarianism, and never had the opportunity to read it. Allow me to explain the term. You recall the Greatest Happiness Principle, of which you were among history’s foremost pioneers?
BENTHAM: Indeed I do. All the more so since it has caused me no end of mischief after death! It holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness – that is, pleasure and the absence of pain – and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness, namely, pain and the privation of pleasure.
MILL: You took the words right out of my mouth – and, incidentally, my book. Yes, all action serves some end, and actions take their moral character from the ends they serve. We long ago concluded that pleasure and freedom from pain are alone desirable as ends. In addition, we reasoned that all desirable things (numerous though they are) are desirable either for their inherent pleasure, or as a means to promote pleasure and prevent pain.
BENTHAM: Yet, if I search for an intuitive meaning of “higher-order pleasure,” I must suppose that some of these pleasures may be assigned a place in a hierarchy, with some being preferable to or more important than others?
MILL: Correct. Our principles of utility allow that some pleasures are more desirable or valuable. For we do, after all, require means of determining which pleasure should take precedence when two or more come into conflict. Therefore we must judge them not only by their quantity, but by their quality. Lemonade?
[Bentham accepts the proffered glass, taking a meditative sip.]
BENTHAM: Have you a method for weighing the quality of pleasures?
MILL: There is a way to ascertain what makes one pleasure more valuable than another merely as a pleasure, irrespective of its being greater in amount. Of two pleasures, if there exists one that all (or almost all) who have experience of both prefer, then it is the more desirable pleasure. Furthermore, if one pleasure is, by those competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it regardless of whether it’s attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not surrender it for any quantity of the other pleasure, then we may ascribe to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it of small account in comparison.
BENTHAM: So, for instance, while all men take pleasure from a hearty meal, they may deem that comparatively fleeting joy less satisfying than, say, the lifelong companionship conferred by a good novel – even though reading taxes the faculties more than eating does. In which case, we’d dub the novel a higher-order pleasure than the meal.
MILL: Indeed, though we should perhaps discuss that comparison with other people, for we are apt to rate art and literature more highly than the average person.
BENTHAM: In any event, I’m curious to learn what could constitute a higher pleasure than reuniting with old friends among such agreeable surroundings.
MILL: About that…
ANOTHER FAMILIAR VOICE: Ah, a new arrival! First-timer, I presume?
[Enter RIMMON, whose guise now appears considerably more angelic than the genial demon’s we remember.]
BENTHAM: Oh, God! You again?
RIMMON: Why, if it isn’t Mr. Bentham! Fancy seeing you here.
BENTHAM: But I thought I’d escaped Hell at last…
[Rimmon raises a glass of lemonade.]
RIMMON: And so you have, sir! But I, too, am moving up in the world. Seems I’ve been awarded a promotion. Fulfilling my punitive role in the afterlife with such aplomb must have produced considerable utility. Perhaps I have you to thank for that? Ha ha!
BENTHAM: Torturing me was a good thing?!
RIMMON: Since you were the first to welcome our new guest, Mr. Mill, I trust you’ve apprised him of how things work in this place?
MILL: We hadn’t quite reached that part.
RIMMON: No matter! Why don’t you return to your higher-order pleasures? I’ll bring Mr. Bentham up to speed myself, and help him find a suitable occupation.
[Mill resumes operating the lemonade press with all his waning might.]
BENTHAM: I must admit, Mr. Rimmon, watching my friend Mill – and his neighbors – toil like this fills me with concern, if not dread. I imagined Heaven being more restful.
RIMMON: Fear not, Mr. Bentham! What you witness Mr. Mill and others practicing is a spiritual restfulness. A peace, and pleasure, of the greatest kind.
[Mill slumps to the ground, spent.]
BENTHAM: But Mill hardly looks rested. Why, he even seems to have fainted from his exertions! We must tend to him!
RIMMON: He’ll be fine. Not like he can die a second time, ha ha! At any rate, before we set you on the path of peace and pleasure, further explanations are evidently required to ease your mind. Let’s start with a question. Would you suppose that the pleasures of a fish are greater, or of a higher order, than a human being’s?
BENTHAM: I imagine not. Humans enjoy certain pleasures that, as far as I know, are inaccessible to fish. Both species may appreciate satiety, but we hear nothing of fish drama, or fish poetry, or fish politics. One presumes it’s because fish are lesser creatures, lacking whatever advanced faculties enable us to perceive and pursue such pleasures.
RIMMON: Reasonable enough. A follow-up question, sir: Would you presume a fish capable of greater suffering than a human being?
[The unconscious Mill moans. Bentham nurses his glass.]
BENTHAM: I think it unlikely. Fish may contend with predation – a situation mercifully foreign to human experience – but being eaten fundamentally amounts to pain of the body, with which all sentient beings are acquainted. I’d hazard that greater suffering follows from, say, losing a child, or… Witnessing the collapse or perversion of one’s life’s work. Concepts that are perhaps unknown and unknowable to the minds of fish.
RIMMON: So beings of higher faculties require more to make them truly happy? And are probably capable of more acute suffering – and certainly accessible to it at more points – than beings of inferior types?
BENTHAM: Our prior encounter must have proven to you the immensity of man’s capacity for suffering, Mr. Rimmon.
RIMMON: Ah, Mr. Bentham, you shall make me nostalgic! But permit me another question. Would you trade places with the fish, so that you might possess its diminished capacity for suffering?
BENTHAM: On no account! I’d lose far more than I’d gain by that transaction.
RIMMON: Aha! This is key. In spite of the liabilities, one never wishes to sink into a lower grade of existence. One wishes to ascend – to experience pleasures of the highest order that one is capable of attaining.
BENTHAM: Agreed.
RIMMON: Then you’re in luck, for it’s precisely those pleasures that Heaven aims to provide.
[Mill moans more plaintively.]
BENTHAM: Forgive my saying so, Mr. Rimmon, but I am uncertain that I witness pleasure of any order here, high or low. My eye perceives only struggle, overwork, and exhaustion.
RIMMON: Because you look at it the wrong way, Mr. Bentham! Be a good utilitarian and consider the actions you’re seeing not in themselves, but in terms of the ends they serve. Our friend Mr. Mill isn’t working himself into the ground for the hell of it. He does so for the heaven of it. His stint at the lemonade press provides relief and refreshment to the afterlife’s other denizens, who then turn their efforts to everyone else’s betterment according to their abilities – via baking bread, stitching books, crafting furniture, or what have you. In this way, all here contribute to the aggregate happiness.
BENTHAM: But they look so unhappy doing it…
RIMMON: Did you not concur with Mr. Mill that certain higher-order pleasures are worth the attendant sacrifice?
BENTHAM: Yes, but… What pleasure are these people sacrificing for?
RIMMON: Why, for the pleasure of a morally good existence.
BENTHAM: Oh dear. Oh dear. I think I begin to understand.
RIMMON: Ask yourself honestly, Mr. Bentham: Is there a pleasure of a higher order than doing good? Than knowing your deeds increase the sum of the world’s happiness? Than living with a clear conscience, confident of your virtue and the rightness of your actions? This is what Heaven offers, Mr. Bentham: Unending opportunity to enjoy the highest-order pleasure available to the highest mode of being.
BENTHAM: Now I see. If good is a product of action, it’s improper to conceptualize it as a state of being. Good is more like a transitive verb. One never is good; one can only do good.And if Heaven is the place of greatest good, that means it’s the place where the most good is done. Therefore Heaven is a space of perpetual doing, now and forever…
RIMMON: Quite so, sir. But don’t believe for a moment that anyone here is compelled into a life of virtue! Most of our residents want to be here. Lest we forget, everybody’s actions on earth continue to reverberate through time. Most people in Heaven are eager to bolster their overall utility, and hedge against unforeseen consequences in the mortal realm that may weigh against them in the ongoing ethical calculus.
BENTHAM: Does anyone do otherwise?
RIMMON: One can always opt not to participate in Heaven, either out of distaste for the state of affairs or confidence in their doings on earth. However… You know the alternative. It usually takes but a single trip to my former domain of employment for people to appreciate the order of things here, ha ha! Now, how skilled are you at installing roof shingles? Our latest crop of arrivals need housing, you see, so you can do a great deal of good in that department.
[Mill stirs, regaining consciousness.]
MILL: What’s the matter, Bentham? Don’t despair. Rejoice. We were right all along, and may now live in a perfect world organized according to our principles. More lemonade?
BENTHAM: Am I indeed in paradise, Mr. Rimmon? I confess, it does not appear so.
RIMMON: Word of honor, Mr. Bentham, this is not only Heaven, but also the only Heaven there is. Come now, cheer up. Take heart, sir, in our friend Mr. Mill’s wise words: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”I suppose that being a philosopher, however disconsolate it leaves you, nonetheless numbers among the highest of pleasures. And in that spirit, I venture to suggest that, however displeasing it may prove, the afterlife examined is the only one worth living.
~
Bio:
Alexander B. Joy is a writer from New Hampshire who holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He is the author of Legend of the River King (Boss Fight Books, 2026) and the editor of Flaxman Low: Occult Detective (MIT Press, 2026). Find him on Bluesky at @aeneas-nin.bsky.social, and see more of his work at alexanderbjoy.com.
Philosophy Note:
This story is a sequel to “Bentham in Hell,” which Sci Phi Journal published back in 2021. Continuing to explore the theme of what a utilitarian afterlife might entail, I decided to investigate Mill’s concept of higher-order pleasures. (He covers this in some depth in Utilitarianism, which is why several of his lines here are adapted from passages in that public domain work.) If Heaven is supposed to be a place where good people are rewarded for a life of virtue, the question for a utilitarian Heaven is what such a reward would look like from a utilitarian perspective. This story arose from taking one possible answer to its most extreme conclusion.
~
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