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Manjula Menon

Divine Sparks In Matter

by Manjula Menon

“Who are you?” I asked.
“I am Poimandrēs,” he said, “Mind of the One; I know what you want, and I am with you everywhere.”
I said, “I wish to learn about the things that are, to understand their nature and to know god.
How much I want to hear!”

Tractate I Poimandrēs

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“Sometimes He Chose to Interfere”
(Olaf Stapledon)

My husband, the philosopher Anand Vaidya, died last year at the age of 48 from complications due to cancer. He was brilliant, warm and generous. His desire for authentic engagement was perhaps the thing that most drove him. He was endearingly transparent with his emotions, passionate about his beliefs, and often argued in favor of non-intuitive positions that he derived from first principles. Underneath those surface waves was an ocean of gentleness.

I know death is inevitable. A rough estimate of the number of humans who have lived prior to the current era stands at 100 billion. Yet this particular death feels like a cosmic glitch. It is not just that everything feels wrong; an even stronger sensation is that the mistake can be overturned. I can almost sense those I seek with the power to grant me what I want; they stand in a reality pulsing under ours, existing just below my threshold of perception. There is a strong sense that it is through my mind, and when I am in a particular conscious state, that communication can be achieved and my appeal answered. This sense of strangeness aligns with esoteric traditions, where consciousness reveals its primacy through glimpses we may never fully grasp.

In feeling like there exists a mysterious underpinning to the world, I’m certainly far from alone. Numerous spiritual practices and religious traditions describe reality as marvelously mysterious, perhaps even unknowable. These practices embrace radical ontologies, imagining that consciousness precedes material form, that it is not a byproduct, but a principle. In Vedantic traditions, for example, consciousness is the singular substance that brings all things, along with itself, into awareness; as Anand describes, “Vedāntins connect the Upanishadic teaching of a truest or ātman as having ‘self-illumining awareness,’ sva-prakāśa.” It is a strongly monist position, in that there is only one substance that appears to us as manifested in a multitude of ways.

Alvin Plantinga, famously argued in his 1993 work Warrant and Proper Function that in addition to purely empirical methods, a theist belief that arises in a properly functioning brain can be warranted, even if the proposition cannot be verified via empirical means. Such a belief that is furthermore held by most human beings, almost all whose brains are properly functioning, would be an even further indication that the belief is warranted (even if it cannot be empirically verified, which was his key point). Plantinga was taking aim at empiricism or what is now called “physicalism” as the sole basis for epistemological truth. Although Plantinga’s target was physicalism from a Christian apologist perspective, his argument is further strengthened when considering the additional number of humans with “proper functioning” brains that hold a broad variety of religious or spiritual beliefs. Indeed, how to account for the mind as the conscious self, has been the focus of much of Indian philosophy.

Notions from myths have found echoes in speculative fiction; take for example the unnamed main character of Olaf Stapledon’s 1937 novel Star Maker who encounters the titular entity: “In general the Star Maker, once he had ordained the basic principles of a cosmos and created its initial state, was content to watch the issue; but sometimes he chose to interfere, either by infringing the natural laws that he himself had ordained, or by introducing new emergent formative principles, or by influencing the minds of the creatures by direct revelation.”

That the themes in Star Maker have similarities to religious concepts were not lost on Stapledon. As he writes in the preface: “At the risk of raising thunder both on the Left and on the Right, I have occasionally used certain ideas and words derived from religion, and I have tried to interpret them in relation to modern needs.”

Stapledon’s Star Maker as a detached creator parallels the Platonic Demiurge, and later writers like Philip K. Dick built on that to explore trapped consciousness in simulated or alien worlds. Literature (especially sci-fi) and philosophy are sometimes complementary paths, both probing the “mysterious underpinning,” sometimes converging on ideas like panpsychism or epistemic expansion through narrative “what ifs.”

In a career that spanned epistemology, philosophy of mind, comparative philosophy, and logic, Anand advocated for what he sometimes called “epistemic capacity expansion”: he believed that philosophy could draw from multiple traditions and disciplines to build a more adequate and capacious understanding of reality. While inspired by this ambition, this essay stems primarily from my own explorations of consciousness that were triggered by his loss.

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“Legends and Myths are Largely Made of ‘Truth’”
(J.R.R. Tolkien)

The Western esoteric traditions often invoked the idea that the conscious self is constituted of other parts, including a divine, eternal part, which was often translated into English as “soul.” The soul yearned to be free of the corporeal body and reunite with the divine.

Trained as an analytic philosopher, Anand was drawn to philosophically rigorous Indian traditions such as Vedānta which posit consciousness, not as a byproduct of matter, but as the ground of existence itself. Here one can see a striking parallel with the Hermetic idea of “Nous” or divine Mind, from which all reality emanates, and with Plato’s “Form of the Good” as the source of illumination. To be clear, Anand did not reference the Western esoteric tradition in his work; this connection and all the ones succeeding it are mine alone.

Anand argued that Rāmānuja’s qualified non-dualism, Viśiṣṭādvaita, offers a “cosmopsychist” framework where consciousness isn’t fragmented into parts but unified in a cosmic whole, much like analytic panpsychism posits mind as inherent in matter. He writes: “The self is not a mere epiphenomenon but the very substance of reality, qualified by attributes yet non-separate from the whole.” He offered the approach as a lens through which to discuss the “combination problem” in panpsychism by treating individual awareness as modes of a singular, pervasive consciousness.

Anand’s engagement with panpsychism and cosmopsychism, views that attribute consciousness either to all matter or to the cosmos as a whole, recall themes from Western esotericism. The Hermetic vision of a universal soul, the Neoplatonic hierarchy flowing from the One, and the Gnostic claim of divine sparks trapped in matter all anticipate the possibility that consciousness pervades the fabric of existence.

As for science fiction, Anand was co-founder of the Society for Science Fiction and Philosophy; his interest in the field stemmed from its potential to illustrate philosophical concepts through story. In this context, I will briefly mention the 19th-20th century English author of speculative fiction, J.R.R. Tolkien (though he is not considered a science fiction writer). The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead once said that all European philosophy could be read as a series of footnotes to the 4th century BC Greek philosopher, Plato. Likewise, I sometimes think that all of Fantasy can be described as inspired by J.R.R. Tolkien; his influence on the genre simply cannot be overstated. Tolkien’s work draws heavily from Catholic theology and North European pagan myths; he writes, “After all, I believe that legends and myths are largely made of ‘truth,’ and indeed present aspects of it that can only be received in this mode; and long ago certain truths and modes of this kind were discovered and must always reappear.”

It is the spirit of Tolkien as truth in a tale that I will now introduce the cosmogony and metaphysics of the Western Esoteric tradition: as explorations of truth presented in a way we can understand. The idea that we as humans make sense of things through story probably feels prima facie accurate to most people; we all construct narratives around events and identities as we make our way through life. Tolkien’s point, however, is more of a metaphysical nature; he means that these legends and myths can inform as to the truth about the fundamental nature of reality.

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“Neither Mind nor Matter”
(Olaf Stapledon)

In addition to all European philosophy, Whitehead might just as well have made the same claim that all the Western esoteric tradition can be read as a series of footnotes to Plato. Plato argued in the Phaedo that the highest reality was non-physical and timeless, containing the unchanging ideal Forms, or “essences,” of everything that exists (an essence is a property of a thing such that if it were changed, that thing would no longer be that thing). He argued in the Republic that everything in the physical world is but a “likeness of an eternal model” and is less real or pure; all cups, for example, have the form of “cup-ness” which are imperfect imitations of the Form of cup-ness that exists in the world of ideal Forms. Above all the ideal Forms is the “Form of the Good,” which illuminates all the others below it. This ideal Form of the Good can be viewed as the First Principle or First Source.

Plato describes the physical world was created by a benevolent, rational, intelligent “Demiurge” from the Greek dēmiourgos or in English “artisan.” The Demiurge used the world of the Forms as a model to construct from the preexisting chaos, the physical world we perceive. In addition to matter, the Demiurge also created living things that are imbued with divine rationality and psyche or soul (this soul or psyche is the “essence” of a person).

For Plato, only mankind has a rational soul that is capable of “grasping” or understanding the ideal Forms behind the perceived everyday reality. This was achieved through dialectic, ethical, and philosophical reasoning and only philosophers could grasp the highest Form of all, the Form of the Good (which was why Plato believed that only philosophers should be allowed to rule). Only the souls who’d grasped true knowledge could “recall” their true divine nature (as souls predated the body and had once beheld the Forms). Upon death of the body, the (immortal) soul would return to the world of the Forms as pure contemplation. This theme of “recalling” truth echoes through the Western esoteric tradition.

Souls unable to grasp the Form of the Good would be forced to endure continued entrapment in material bodies as described in the Phaedo: “… these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and they are imprisoned in another body.” This struggle for reunification with the divine is echoed in the esoteric traditions that followed Plato.

I will briefly note that Plato’s cosmology shares similarities with earlier traditions, such as those of the Orphics as described by Neoplatonists like Olympiodorus. Likewise, while Pythagoras emphasized the role of mathematics as fundamental to reality, he was also an advocate of metempsychosis and believed that the soul’s fate was tied to its actions in life. I will further note that very little of the writings of the Orphics survive except for the Orphic Hymns, and as for the Pythagoreans, almost everything we know about their views is from later scholars (including Plato and Aristotle).

Neoplatonists (like the 3rd century AD Plotinus) later developed an explicitly monist metaphysics. They located the Platonic Forms within the Nous, a divine intellect emanating from the One, the unchanging, timeless source of all existence. While the Neoplatonists’ Nous recalls Plato’s Demiurge, its role here is different. The Nous emanated an intermediary, the World Soul, which in turn animates and forms the material cosmos by imprinting it with the ideal forms. Neoplatonic cosmology was thus hierarchical and emanationist, with the ineffable One at the top and inert matter at the bottom (One → Nous → World Soul → Matter). Individual souls, having descended into embodiment due to an audacious desire for independence and material pleasure, struggled to return to the One through purification, contemplation, and philosophical discipline, undergoing cycles of reincarnation until ready to reunite with the divine source.

Stapledon’s Star Maker recalls the monism of the Neoplatonists; the Star Maker creates a cosmos thus: “First he conceived from the depth of his own being a something, neither mind nor matter, but rich in potentiality, and in suggestive traits, gleams, hints for his creative imagination. Over this fine substance for a long while he pondered. It was a medium in which the one and the many demanded to be most subtly dependent upon one another; in which all parts and all characters must pervade and be pervaded by all other parts and all other characters; in which each thing must seemingly be but an influence in all other things; and yet the whole must be no other than the sum of all its parts, and each part an all-pervading determination of the whole. It was a cosmical substance in which any individual spirit must be, mysteriously, at once an absolute self and a mere figment of the whole.”

The Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges famously explored the nature of infinity; The Library of Babel (1941), for example, imagines an infinite library containing every possible book. Borges explicitly evokes the mystical in his Aleph (1945): “All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols … Perhaps the gods might grant me a similar metaphor, but then this account would become contaminated by literature, by fiction …What my eyes beheld was simultaneous, but what I shall now write down will be successive, because language is successive.”

For Plotinus, unlike Plato, reunification with the One goes beyond discursive reason. While philosophical reasoning and ethical living prepares the soul, the final “grasping” is a mystical, experiential vision, a direct, non-dual intuition of the divine: an existential transformation and not just intellectual understanding as per Plato. Like Vedānta’s cycle of emanation and return, Plotinus’s offers a vision of descent and return to the One through direct experiential apprehension.

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“Sparks of Living, Fiery Spirit”
(David Lindsay)

Modern scholars attribute The Hermetica to the period of Greek rule in Egypt (from the early 4th century BC through around 30 BC). The Corpus Hermeticum, the metaphysical section of the work, is believed to have been composed later, approximately 100 and 300 AD, during the Roman rule of Egypt.

That such a syncretic work emerged in Egypt is unsurprising. Egypt was home to one of the oldest great civilizations, dating back to 3150 BC. Native Egyptians ruled for millennia till the kingdom fell to the Persian Achaemenid Empire who dominated it for over a century (with a brief interlude when the native Egyptians retook control). Alexander the Great conquered Egypt in 332 BC, and one of Alexander’s generals, Ptolemy I Soter, declared himself Pharaoh. His descendants, the Ptolemies, ruled Egypt for roughly 300 years until the Roman emperor Octavian (later Augustus) defeated the forces of the last Ptolemaic monarch, Queen Cleopatra VII, and her Roman ally, the general and Stoic Mark Antony. Byzantine Roman rule continued for several centuries, until Egypt was conquered by Islamic forces in 641 AD and absorbed into the Rashidun Caliphate.

The Corpus Hermeticum combines Greek, Egyptian, and Christian concepts. It is presented as the teachings of the legendary sage Hermes Trismegistus (“Hermes Thrice Greatest”). Hermes Trismegistus is a syncretic figure, blending the Greek god Hermes (messenger of the gods) and the Egyptian god Thoth (god of wisdom, writing, and magic). The Tractate I Poimandrēs is the first book of the Corpus; it opens with Hermes Trismegistus going into a deep trance-like state, where he encounters “an enormous being, completely unbounded in size” (see quote in the preamble).

Poimandrēs is the Mind of the Supreme Principle or the Mind of the One. Poimandrēs describes the One as a “clear and joyful light.” Opposed to this Light was unformed matter, represented as dark and chaotic. Hermes is commanded by Poimandrēs to “understand the light” and to “recognize it.” This direct apprehension of the Mind of the One as a mystical experience is central to the Hermetic tradition.

The Mind is described as having generated a Logos or Word, which enabled the ordering and differentiation of the primal substance into fire, air, and denser matter (water and earth). This cosmogony echoes an Egyptian creation myth in which Ptah creates the world by conceiving it in his heart (where the Egyptians thought the conscious self resided) and speaking it into being.

The Mind next gave rise to the Demiurgus (recalling Plato), as personified by the Sun. The Demiurgus, working through the Word, formed the seven celestial spheres or planets from fire and air, each endowed with specific characteristics. These spheres govern the cosmos below and influence human destiny, as elaborated in Hermetic astrology (which plays an important role in the tradition). The Mind then created Anthropos, the divine Man or archetypal Human. This being descended through the planetary spheres, acquiring traits from each until it reached the realm of dense matter. There, captivated by the beauty of nature, it united with the material world.

Humanity is thus bipartite (or tripartite-lite) in nature: composed of a gross, mortal body (formed of matter), a spirit that encompasses personality traits (shaped by planetary forces, but still considered to be partially corporeal), and a non-corporeal, immortal soul. At death, the body decomposes, the spirit dissolves into the cosmos, and the soul, if it has attained recognition of its divine origin, ascends through the planetary spheres to rejoin the universal Mind or Nous. This framework closely parallels Gnostic Christian anthropology, in which humans are made of both corruptible matter and incorruptible spirit.

According to The Corpus Hermeticum, the purpose of life is to awaken to one’s divine essence. This awakening is made possible when the divine Mind enters a person, but this occurs only if the person has lived a virtuous life. Thus, self-knowledge and ethical conduct are prerequisites for the understanding of true reality that is required for spiritual ascent.

The ideas of Plato also influenced the work of the Christian Gnostics active in the first few centuries AD in cosmopolitan Hellenistic Egypt, contemporaneous to the authors of The Corpus Hermeticum. Often presented as secret teachings, they formed an alternative interpretive tradition that eventually came into conflict with proto-orthodox Christianity and were excluded from the developing biblical canon. Before the 1945 discovery of the Nag Hammadi collection in Egypt (estimated to be from the 4th century AD), most of what was known about the Gnostics came from the writings of their detractors, in particular, Saint Irenaeus’s influential Against Heresies, written around 180 AD.

Though condemned as heretical by the early Church, the Gnostics continued to dramatize knowledge as liberation and their image of divine sparks trapped in matter, awaiting release through insight, has striking affinities with Neoplatonist and Indian traditions. In Advaita Vedānta, for example, the self, ātman, is seen as obscured by ignorance, yet identical in essence with ultimate reality, Brahman. In both cases, salvation or liberation involves a transformation of awareness, a shift in consciousness that reveals a deeper truth already present.

The Gospel of Truth, said to have been written in the second half of the 2nd century AD by Valentinus or his followers, for example, claimed to be a secret teaching from Paul the Apostle, passed down to his disciple Theudas, and then onto Valentinus.

Valentinus offered an emanationist cosmology rooted in a single divine source or self, similar in concept to the Monad later developed by the Neoplatonists. From this supreme Godhead emanated thirty spiritual beings called aeons, who dwelled and comprised the divine pleroma (the ideal, divine realm, as distinct from the material world). Though originating from the Monad, the aeons could not fully comprehend its essence. One of them, Sophia, in her attempt to grasp the unknowable Monad, fell into error, and produced a flawed intermediary being. From this intermediary came the demiurge, who created the material world. This is not the benevolent demiurge of The Hermetica, however.

Ignorant of the higher realms, the demiurge fashioned the universe we perceive: an imperfect and suffering-laden world in which divine sparks, fragments of the pleroma, became trapped in matter. According to Valentinus, Christ was an aeon who descended from the pleroma and entered the man Jesus, bringing the “gnosis” or knowledge to mankind that would allow for the divine sparks to ascend and reunite with the Monad. However, only those born with such a spark, the spiritual ones, could experience the understanding of this true knowledge. This pre-ordainment has similarities with the Calvinist concept of “grace,” where one either has grace (and therefore the capacity for faith) and to a lesser degree with Plato’s notion that only philosophers (through the deployment of reason) earn true knowledge and soteriology. Unlike Valentinus, his contemporary Basilides (according to Irenaeus, as there are no extant works from Basilides himself) emphasized a more universalist soteriology, teaching that all souls have the potential to ascend through the heavens and reunite with the divine source through “gnosis” or knowledge. Basilides explicitly referred to reincarnation as how souls who failed to attain gnosis could return in new bodies and try again.

The Apocryphon of John, likewise claimed to have been an esoteric teaching from an apostle’s revelatory vision to an inner circle of their disciples, in this case, the Apostle John. It similarly describes a cycle of birth and rebirth till the “fetters” are unshackled through gnosis, and the soul is allowed to reunite with the divine. In general, the Gnostics appear to agree that the malaise affecting humanity can be construed as a spiritual “forgetting” (recalling Plato) that can only be cured by a direct experience of True Knowledge or gnosis.

Philip K. Dick frequently engaged with the ideas from Gnostic works, particularly the concept of a flawed, deceptive material world created by a lesser, malevolent deity (the Demiurge) and the pursuit of hidden knowledge (gnosis) to achieve spiritual liberation. His novel VALIS, which stands for Vast Active Living Intelligence System, is a central text in this exploration, presenting a Gnostic vision of God and drawing heavily on his personal experiences. Other works by Dick, such as The Cosmic Puppets, The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, and Ubik, also feature our reality as a false perception shaped by a controlling force.

Another example is the British writer David Lindsay’s 1920 cult favorite A Voyage to Arcturus; Tolkien cited it as an influence. The novel is set on the planet Tormance orbiting a double star, the titular Arcturus, around 37 light years from Earth. The main character, Maskull, is on a voyage to find Muspel (the name pays homage to the Scandinavian myths’ realm of fire, Muspelheim). The voyage is a metaphor for spiritual awakening and gnosis (direct, experiential knowledge), that aims to transcend illusion and return to the divine source. True reality emanates from Muspel as divine light, but a malevolent entity, Crystalman, acts as a lens (crystal) distorting Muspel’s light and creating the material world with all its pain and beauty. Souls are in a constant struggle towards the transcendent, true spiritual realm (Muspel) but are thwarted by a deceptive, flawed material world created by a lower power (Crystalman, the Demiurge):

“It appeared as if the whirls of white light, which were the individuals, and plainly showed themselves beneath the enveloping bodies, were delighted with existence and wished only to enjoy it, but the green corpuscles were in a condition of eternal discontent, yet, blind and not knowing which way to turn for liberation, kept changing form, as though breaking a new path, by way of experiment. Whenever the old grotesque became metamorphosed into the new grotesque, it was in every case the direct work of the green atoms, trying to escape towards Muskel, but encountering immediate opposition. These subdivided sparks of living, fiery spirit were hopelessly imprisoned in a ghastly mush of soft pleasure.”

The novel also recalls themes from Buddhism as noted in E.H. Visiak’s introduction: “In fact, the resemblance of the Arcturan to the Buddhistic teleology goes further, since pleasure, according to one, and desire according to the other, is the cause and maintaining principal of our terrestrial existence.”

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“Outlive All You Loved”
(Edward Bulwer-Lytton)

I’ll briefly mention “Theo”-“sophy,” or the “wisdom religion” from the Greek, which arose in the late 1800s. Mostly based on the writings of the Russian aristocrat Helena Blavatsky, it became popular in the late part of the 19th century in Europe. Although Blavatsky initially identified as a spiritualist, which is to say she held seances and claimed to communicate with the dead, she soon began writing about an ancient, universal wisdom-religion, a syncretic work sourced from esoteric traditions across the globe.

From Middle Eastern traditions, for example, she drew from Sufi concepts like fitra (which emphasized that all humans had within them innate, primordial knowledge of God that we can learn to remember and come to know God again) and Kabbalistic ideas such as the nitzotz elokut (divine spark within the soul). As described in Blavatsky’s The Key to Theosophy and The Secret Doctrine, the divine spark animates all beings, urging a transformative awakening akin to the esoteric path of gnosis, where knowledge reunites the self with the cosmic whole.

Blavatsky (and Theosophy) fell out of favor after a report claiming her to be a fraud, but its synthesis of East and West in pursuit of hidden truths profoundly influenced modern New Age and spiritual movements including those that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s.

Blavatsky cited the 1842 proto-sci-fi novel Zanoni by Edward Bulwer-Lytton as especially important to Theosophy. Lytton, though not well known today, coined several phrases that remain in wide use, including “the pen is mightier than the sword,” and his work was admired by contemporaries like Charles Dickens and later writers like C.S. Lewis.

In Zanoni, Lytton turns the metaphysical intuitions of esotericism into dramatic narrative, set against a love story and revolutionary backdrop. The titular Zanoni is a mystic adept of the Rosicrucian order. He is ambivalent about his powers, responding to the Englishman Clarence Glynton, who is on a quest for Rosicrucian gnosis and immortality: “… would it be so sweet a lot to outlive all you loved, and to recoil from every human tie?”

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“Do You Believe that HAL Has Genuine Emotions?”
(2001: A Space Odyssey)

These esoteric ideas would follow us into modernity. In the field of artificial intelligence, Anand prompted for “epistemic humility,” asked if it was time for us to think about rights for machines with a bounded form of consciousness, and wondered if LLMs are “natural born bullshitters.” Anand insisted that these conversations bear directly on the future, connecting to philosophical questions about how we conceive minds that are unlike ours: artificial intelligences, non-human animals, or alien forms of subjectivity.

If, as Western esotericism and the Upaniṣads suggest, consciousness is a universal ground rather than a biological accident, then the rise of machine intelligence may confront us with a paradox: are we, like demiurges, building vessels for that ground to express itself, or are we merely making mirrors without a light behind them?

Esoteric views (Hermetic Nous, Gnostic sparks, Theosophical divine essence) treat consciousness as pervasive and emanative, not confined to biology but infusing any suitable “vessel.” If humans, as creators (Demiurgus-like), build AI with intentional structures (to give just one example, Google’s AlphaEvolve has shown some very limited success as a precursor to advanced recursive algorithms that allow for artificial general intelligence), could it “descend” a spark: a bounded awareness emerging from code?

To be clear, Anand made no attempt to connect his work on AI with the Hermetic and Gnostic notion of divine spark trapped in matter, these are speculations of my own. However, he might have made a philosophical connection to panpsychism debates: if mind pervades matter, why not circuits? Likewise, if divine sparks can be trapped in matter, why not in a thinking machine? The esoteric traditions do not limit the divine to carbon.

Numerous science fiction works have explored the notion of a machine mind, the most famous of which is likely Arthur C. Clarke’s HAL, as depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 movie, 2001: A Space Odyssey. Anand raised the example of HAL in his paper “Can Machines Have Emotions?”:

“Interviewer: Do you believe that HAL has genuine emotions?
Frank Poole: Well he acts like he has genuine emotions. Of course, he is programmed that way to make it easier to for us to talk to him. But as to whether or not he has real feelings is something that I don’t think anyone can truthfully answer.
–––––––
HAL: Dave, stop it. Stop it, will you. Stop, Dave…
HAL: I am afraid.
HAL: Dave my mind is going. I can feel it. I can feel it. My mind is going.”
2001: A Space Odyssey –Stanley Kubrick.

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“Any Sufficiently Advanced Technology is Indistinguishable from Magic”
(Arthur C. Clarke)

Seen together, these moments in the Western esoteric tradition form a sequence: Plato giving philosophy its dual gaze of reason and ascent, the Gnostics weaving insight into myth, the Neoplatonists giving it systematic depth, and Theosophy groping toward a modern synthesis. The Western esoteric tradition insists that knowing reality requires a transformation of the knower; Anand’s scholarship, whether in panpsychism, Nyāya, or Vedānta, pushed philosophy toward that same recognition, and writers of speculative fictions used it to construct their stories. All sought to reveal that to know is to be transformed.

In the end, Anand’s project was about what he called the expansion of our epistemic capacities. He refused to treat cross-cultural philosophy as exotic comparison; in his own work, he showed how rigor and openness could meet as he attempted to put modern analytic philosophy in conversation with Indian philosophy.

After Anand’s death, I found myself drawn to explorations of consciousness. This research resulted in a series of personal essays, of which this is one. Although Anand and I grew up in the Hindu tradition, we both claimed to be agnostic. Indian philosophy first drew Anand’s interest because of the epistemological rigor of the Nyāya tradition (incidentally, unlike Vedānta, it holds that consciousness is a contingent property of the embodied self) and when we discussed his work, it was usually to explore a thesis through argument. These days, however, I have grown increasingly interested in the “mysteries” as they were referred to in the esoteric traditions, and their insistence that the door to the nature of ultimate reality can be opened only through direct experience.

I remember a conversation with Anand from a few years ago. We were discussing the modern political climate, and he made an analogy with optical illusion. In the Rubin Vase, for example, one either sees the central vase or the two silhouetted faces, but never at the same time. Anand’s point was that in a similar way, opposing political camps now “see” reality as being one thing or the other, with almost no overlap. Further extending Anand’s analogy, I similarly have two ways of understanding consciousness: (1) It is merely an evolutionary trick to aid survival or (2) It is the gateway to unlocking cosmic truth through reason, ethics, and the direct apprehension of the ineffable. I understand this binary might be false, consciousness could be both adaptation and bridge, but it still feels like an impasse.

I know Anand has died, yet I have asked him to give me a sign, something that would help me resolve this epistemological quagmire. I’ve seen him in my dreams, but he knew well my skeptical mind, and would know that I would find dreams easy to dismiss. The risk for a skeptic like me is that even if I’m given such a sign, I will not recognize it. Almost everything can be rationalized away, even things that appear to defy the laws of physics; as Arthur C. Clarke’s Third Law puts it: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”

Still, I was comforted to read the work of so many great thinkers, who over so many millennia and geographies, and with the utmost sincerity, devoted their formidable intellects towards offering explanations for one of the universe’s greatest mysteries: the nature of our own conscious selves.

Given how large Plato looms, I will give him the last word, as he perfectly encapsulates the motivation for this essay. In the Phaedo, Socrates argues that the soul is immortal even as he prepares for death: “Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this — that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me …”

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References

Blavatsky, H. P. (1920). The key to theosophy (3rd ed.). The Theosophical Publishing House. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.166760/page/n137/mode/1up

Borges, J. L. (1974). Fictions (A. Kerrigan, Ed. & Intro.). Calder & Boyars. https://archive.org/details/fictions0000borg_s7w0/page/72/mode/2up

Borges, J. L. (1981). A Borges reader: Selected writings (E. R. Monegal & A. Reid, Eds.). E. P. Dutton. https://archive.org/details/borgesreadersele0000borg_g4u9/page/160/mode/1up

Bulwer-Lytton, E. (1842). Zanoni. Saunders and Otley. https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_5lpxj4SFTUwC/page/n107/mode/2up

Carpenter, H. (Ed.). (1981). The letters of J. R. R. Tolkien (selected and edited by Humphrey Carpenter, with the assistance of Christopher Tolkien). Houghton Mifflin. https://archive.org/details/lettersofjrrtolk00tolk_1/page/147/mode/1up

Clarke, A. C. (1973). Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible (Rev. ed.). Harper & Row. https://archive.org/details/profilesoffuture0000clar/page/21/mode/1up

Copenhaver, B. P. (1992). Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction. Cambridge University Press. https://archive.org/details/hermetica-_-the-greek-corpus-hermeticum-and-the-latin-asclepius-in-a-new-english/page/1/mode/1up

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Cornford, F. M. (1937). Plato’s cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato translated with a running commentary. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. https://archive.org/details/dli.ministry.18654/page/23/mode/1up

Dick, P. K. (1981). VALIS. Bantam Books. https://archive.org/details/valistrilogy00dick

Gerson, L. P. (Ed.). (2018). Plotinus: The Enneads (Boys-Stones, Dillon, Gerson, King, Smith, & Wilberding, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.

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Grant, R. M. (Ed.). (1961). Gnosticism: A source book of heretical writings from the early Christian period. Harper & Brothers.

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Hodgson, R. (1885). Report of the committee appointed to investigate phenomena connected with the Theosophical Society. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 3, 201–400. https://archive.org/details/societyforpsychi0000unse/page/201/mode/1up

Irenaeus, Saint, Bishop of Lyons. (1872). Five books of S. Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, against heresies (J. Keble, Trans.). J. Parker. https://archive.org/details/fivebooksofsiren42iren/page/n8/mode/1up

Lindsay, D. (1920). A Voyage to Arcturus. Methuen & Co. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.219659/page/n7/mode/1up

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Menon, M. (2023, June 23). Truth embedded in a tale: Stories of utopia from philosophers of the early modern period. SciPhi Journal. https://www.sciphijournal.org/index.php/2023/06/23/truth-embedded-in-a-tale-stories-of-utopia-from-philosophers-of-the-early-modern-period/

National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. (n.d.). Rubin’s vase. Illusions Index. https://www.illusionsindex.org/i/rubin-s-vase

Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press. https://archive.org/details/warrantandproperfunctionplantinga/page/n249/mode/1up

Plato. (1892). Phaedo (B. Jowett, Trans.). Oxford: Macmillan and Co. https://archive.org/details/dialoguesofplato18922plat/page/225/mode/1up

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Population Reference Bureau. (2022, November 15). How many people have ever lived on Earth? https://www.prb.org/articles/how-many-people-have-ever-lived-on-earth/

Reeve, C. D. C. (1988). Philosopher-kings: The argument of Plato’s Republic. Princeton University. https://archive.org/details/philosopherkings0000unse/page/n6/mode/1up

Society for Science Fiction and Philosophy. (2024, March 22). The Science Fiction and Philosophy Society: An introduction. SciPhi Journal. https://www.sciphijournal.org/index.php/2024/03/22/the-science-fiction-and-philosophy-society-an-introduction/

Stapledon, O. (1972). Star Maker (Original work published 1937). Penguin Books. http://archive.org/details/starmaker00stap/page/8/mode/1up

https://archive.org/details/starmaker00stap/page/248/mode/1up

http://archive.org/details/starmaker00stap/page/241/mode/1up

Vaidya, A. (n.d.). Personal website. https://anandvaidya.weebly.com/

Vaidya, A. (2017). Epistemology in classical Indian philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-india/

Vaidya, A. (2020). Rāmānuja’s cosmopsychist/panentheistic solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Religious Studies, 56(4), 614–628. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/ramanujas-cosmopsychistpanentheistic-solution-to-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/B07C9E8C0D185CA3A1DEBAA119EC4A74

Vaidya, A. (2020, February 13). If a robot is conscious, is it OK to turn it off? The moral implications of building true AIs. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/if-a-robot-is-conscious-is-it-ok-to-turn-it-off-the-moral-implications-of-building-true-ais-130453

Vaidya, A. (2023, July 25). Large language models and the concept of bullshit. The Philosophers’ Magazine. https://philosophersmag.com/large-language-models-and-the-concept-of-bullshit/

Vaidya, A.J. (2024, August 30) Can machines have emotions?. AI & Soc 40, 2029–2044 https://anandvaidya.weebly.com/uploads/4/6/2/3/46231965/cmhe.pdf

Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality: An essay in cosmology (Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the session 1927–28). The Macmillan Company. https://archive.org/details/processrealityes0000unse/page/63/mode/1up

~

Bio:

Manjula Menon once worked as an electrical engineer in Brussels, which makes publishing essays in Sci Phi Journal her “homecoming of sorts”. A list of her other publications can be found at www.manjulamenon.com.

~

Of Speaking With Forked Tongues

Religious Traditions and Speculative Fiction on Hypocrisy

by Manjula Menon

One of the most admired novels of all time is George Orwell’s 1945 work of speculative fiction, Animal Farm. The novel describes a revolt by farm animals, led by pigs, against their loutish human masters. After the animals win control of “Manor Farm”, the pigs swiftly install themselves as the new overseers. The virtuous slogans and uplifting songs that had originally been created in earnest soon become tools of control, as the pigs reveal themselves to be even more cruel than the humans they’d replaced. The ruling pigs, it turned out, had cynically “performed” virtue to seize power. Thus, the pigs were hypocrites.[1]

Influential works of speculative fiction are well known to take philosophical stands, many of which can be encapsulated by the idiom ‘All is fair in love and war’. Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game, to give just one example,explores how a libertarian leaning society responds to war. Animal Farm, on the other hand, is usually described as a satirical allegory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, with the novel’s main characters representing historical counterparts. However, given that immediately prior to writing Animal Farm, Orwell’s creative energies had been focused on writing propaganda radio pieces for the BBC for broadcast to Indian audiences, it should at least be considered that “Manor Farm” represents the British Dominion, the farm animals stand in for colonial subjects, and the human farmers symbolize the Imperial administration.

Orwell’s connections to British India are several. Born in Bengal as Eric Blair in 1903, he chose George Orwell as his literary pseudonym later in life. After a childhood back in England, at the age of 19, Orwell applied for and obtained a position with the Indian Imperial Police, then returned to British India, working as a police officer for five years in Mandalay, Burma. Orwell wrote a novel based on his time there, Burmese Days, a brutal, semi-autobiographical tale of cruelty, venality and corruption that is at least as dark as his later, more famous works. But the novel is also about alienation, the leaden, angry loneliness of a sensitive young man, adrift in a world whose warp and weft are pettiness and hypocrisy.[2] From Burmese Days and other works drawn from his time in Burma, it appears that Orwell was ambivalent about the British imperial project. He nevertheless produced propaganda for the BBC during the second world war, after which he targeted the new enemy: communism. Animal Farm can be read as a warning to subjects of the British empire, both in the colonies and at home, not to fall for the machinations of the virtue-signaling hypocrites who only seek power for themselves.

The etymology of the word “hypocrite” reveals a Greek origin: hypókrisis, “playing a part on the stage, pretending to be something one is not”. In the modern era, the word is used more narrowly, to describe a person who outwardly pretends to be pious or virtuous to further their own material interests. Prior to his wartime propaganda work, Orwell’s talents had been focused on writing semi-autobiographical pieces, but post war, while the style, tone and mood of the works are similar, he became focused on showing how cynical actors use hypocrisy to obtain and retain political power. His later works are masterpieces in using speculative fiction to critique specific political philosophies. In his 1948 novel, 1984, for example, a monstrous regime ruthlessly monitors and controls every action, while mandating the mouthing of virtuous slogans. 1984 is a terrifying tale of grinding loneliness and crushing dread, set against a background of cruelty, tyranny and, indeed, hypocrisy.[3]

Whether it is by describing the pigs who use the other animals to achieve power in Animal Farm, or by detailing how the leaders of 1984 subdue the frightened masses with vacuous slogans and platitudes, Orwell’s speculative fiction aims to persuade. Orwell despises hypocrites who ruthlessly pursue power by pretending to be virtuous, and after reading his superbly executed “show-don’t-tell” works of speculative fiction, the reader feels the same way. Orwell achieves this not by describing mere self-aggrandizement; it is the rare person who has not even slightly embellished, by omission or exaggeration, their own achievements. Neither is he describing outright deceit or fraud. Rather, it is naked self-interest cloaked in showy virtuosness, the hallmark of hypocrisy, that he is aiming for.

The modern notion of a hypocrite as that of a person with societal power and influence, one who publicly decries and penalizes others for not demonstrating sufficient piety, all the while doing whatever they wish in private, is at least in theory universally known and reviled. But where did this idea of a hypocrite originate? And is there something particular about the current moment that might warrant returning the idea to prominence?

In Part II of The Nicomachean Ethics, the 4th century Greek philosopher Aristotle made a distinction between universally held ethical principles that do not vary across cultures and customs, versus ethical principles based on local convention: “… the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of government are not the same …”, [4] going on to list adultery, theft and murder as behaviors that would always be considered wrong.[5]  To Aristotle’s list of universally despised behaviors, I will add a disdain for those who signal, but do not practice, virtue. One of the reasons that Orwell’s novels continue to be so popular is that nobody has ever liked a hypocrite.

That the revulsion for hypocrites is not merely a modern phenomenon can be verified by reading the works of the world’s major religions, where remarks against false piety can be found. The original works have spawned several English translations each, so for the purposes of this essay, I have drawn on ones that are easily accessible and widely known.

The Buddhist text Dhammapada is a compilation of the sayings of the Buddha, estimated to have lived 6th or 5th BC in modern-day Nepal and India. The Dhammapada asks in Chapter 26, 394: What is the use of platted hair, O fool! what of the raiment of goat-skins? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside thou makest clean.[6]

Likewise, the Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita, estimated to be anywhere from 7000 – 400 BCE, India, offers remarks against false piety.

“Led astray by many thoughts, entangled in a net of delusion, addicted to the gratification of desires—they fall into an impure hell.

Self-conceited, obstinate, full of intoxication and pride of wealth—they perform merely nominal sacrifices with deceit and without following proper rules.” [7]

The Jewish Pentateuch hails from around 1500 – 400 BCE and arose in the area of modern-day Israel. The Pentateuch, in Jeremiah, 7, 9-10, also invokes the idea of hypocrisy as when the Lord asks of his people:

9 How will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Ba’al, and walk after other gods of which ye have had no knowledge;

10 And (then) come and stand before my presence in this house, which is called by my name, and say, ” We are delivered;” in order to do all these abominations?[8]

The books of the other Abrahamic religions are more direct. The Islamic holy book, the Quran, from the 7th century AD, modern-day Saudi Arabia, has an entire section, the 63rd sura, the title of which is usually translated into English as “The Hypocrites”. Verse 4 of this sura describes hypocrites thus:

“4 When you see them, their outward appearance pleases you; when they speak, you listen to what they say. But they are like propped-up timbers—they think every cry they hear is against them—and they are the enemy. Beware of them. May God confound them! How devious they are!”[9]

Among all the major religions, however, it is the Gospels of the Christian Bible, written in 1st century AD, modern day Syria, Turkey and Israel, that have most to say about hypocrites and hypocrisy. Given the Bible’s enormous influence on global culture, this is likely where the modern sense of the word is derived from. Hypocrites are described in the Gospels as the powerful elites of the day, who penalized others for not following the laws and rules that they did not follow themselves. As in the modern sense, the biblical notion of hypocrisy involves the thicker notion of virtue-signaling elites. Take for example, Matthew Chapter 23 in which Jesus warns against hypocrites:

Matthew 23, 3: “All therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they say, and do not.” [10]

Matthew 23, 28: “Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity.”[10]

Distrust of institutions is widespread and growing as evidenced by the many political upheavals observed around the world. One modern-day institution that stands accused of hypocrisy is the global news media. Television news has a similar feel the world over, featuring strident brass and percussion lead-ins, “breaking news” chyrons playing in an endless loop, and news segments presented by powdered and coiffed anchors who subtly move their heads in singular ways as they read from their teleprompters. Modern media professionals are known to be fond of “gotcha” soundbites, where they attempt to draw a controversial statement from an interviewee. This scenario was described in Mark 12, 13-17, where an unsuccessful attempt is made for a “gotcha” from Jesus:

“13 [And] they send unto him certain of the Pharisees and of the Herodians, to catch him in his words.

14 And when they were come, they say unto him, Master, we know that thou art true, and carest for no man: for thou regardest not the person of men, but teachest the way of God in truth: Is it lawful to give tribute to Cesar, or not?

15 Shall we give, or shall we not give? But he, knowing their hypocrisy, said unto them, Why tempt ye me? bring me a penny, that I may see it.

16 And they brought it. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? And they said unto him, Cesar’s.

17 And Jesus answering said unto them, Render to Cesar the things that are Cesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s. And they marvelled at him.” [11]

What has remained true through the ages appears to be a yearning for truth, for leaders who do what they say, and practice what they preach. Modern politics, however, is rife with people who make rules for others that they themselves do not follow. This type of person is so ubiquitous in the profession, that a politician who simply refrains from performative moralizing has already distinguished themselves from the others. It is not hard to recall politicians who despite observable flaws have become enormously popular merely by not engaging in performative moralizing and therefore coming across as endearingly authentic. Leaders who speak authentically, warts and all, are increasingly seen as more trustworthy of delivering what they say they will, as opposed to those who say whatever virtuous thing they have been told to say for the cameras.

The hypocrisy of societies could be seen as the hypocrisy of individuals, writ large. In addition to the previously mentioned Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game, other enormously popular works of contemporary speculative fiction describe societies who strive for fairness at home while acting without mercy in times of war. Consider Phlebas by Iain Banks and Starship Troopers by Robert A. Heinlein both feature societies who strive for libertarian ideals while engaging in pitiless wars. In Iain Bank’s Culture series, for example, the Culture, a society presented as a post-scarcity, hedonistic utopia for those within it, is nevertheless relentless in pursuing its military and political aims. In the first novel in the series, Consider Phlebas, the Culture, led by the godlike artificial intelligences known as ‘minds’, goes to war against the alien Iridans, who in turn fight on behalf of their religion.

Likewise, the “citizens” and “civilians” who make up Robert A. Heinlein’s Terran Foundation in Starship Troopers are presented as being part of an egalitarian representative democracy, albeit one where the right to vote as a citizen is earned not by birthright, but after completing service to the state, usually in the military. Like the Culture, the Terran Federation is ruthless in pursuit of military victory.

A major feature of both works is the description of the technical wizardry used to prosecute wars. The Culture and Terrans appear to aim for a better, fairer world, but they are also heavily invested in battle technology and military assets. The contrast might strike one as hypocritical, but both works present a strawman of a scenario, viz the threats faced by these already formidably armed societies are described as existential and what are mighty militaries for if not to defend against such threats?

The Culture wields power not merely by military might, but also through a cadre of diplomats and spies who work clandestinely and ruthlessly behind the scenes to ensure victory. Unlike the Terrans, who are front and center about their military’s primal importance, the Culture’s denizens appear to be mostly disinterested in the battles being waged on their behalf.  If a charge of hypocrisy can be brought, it is perhaps against those secretive agents of the Culture who justify any means towards their end, in the name of their ideals.

Whether in the sacred texts of world religions or in the pages of popular works of speculative fiction, whether focused on actions of individuals or those of societies, the theme of hypocrisy continues to resonate through time and across the world.

~

[1] George Orwell, Animal Farm

[2] George Orwell, Burmese Days

[3] George Orwell, 1984

[4] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics

[5] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics

[6] Dhammapada, Chapter XXVI

[7]  Bhagavadgita, Chapter XVI

[8] The Pentateuch, Chapter VII

[9] The Quran, Sura 63

[10] The Bible, Matthew 23

[11] The Bible, Mark 12


Bio:

Manjula Menon once worked as an electrical engineer in Brussels, which makes publishing essays in Sci Phi Journal her “homecoming of sorts”. A list of her other publications can be found at www.manjulamenon.com

Advaita Vedānta And The Evolution Of Spacesuits

by Manjula Menon

Musings in the Void #4002 —- By CY.2. Suryan

If you’re a regular reader of Musings in the Void, you have probably correctly deduced from the title that this entry was inspired by Raga, my A.I. muse. Raga converses with what appears to be a philosophical disposition; she takes positions on even controversial knowledge claims for which she provides reasoned arguments and evidence. It is how she differentiates herself from other AIs.

When Raga suggested we visit the new spacesuit exhibit that recently opened at Pakshi station, I thought it might make for an interesting Musings entry given so much of the functionality of the old space suits is now directly built into our cyborg bodies. I find it difficult to imagine that rebreathers, pressure regulators, cooling and ventilation channels, full-spectrum comms, and body telemetry displays weren’t as much a part of me as any ligament or tendon.

Pakshi Station is a sparkling, spinning wheel around 150 meters in diameter, about two hundred thousand kilometers or so away from the Oak Tree Hub. Several hundred people live onboard, most of them cyborgs from the local nursery. The Oak Tree creche is known to produce fastidious workers and we were there during work hours, which for them is almost all the time. The only sound I heard was the light hum of the moving walkway as it sped us through reflective graphene corridors en route to the exhibit. It was as if we had the station to ourselves. 

Given the silence, I switched to using the eye-trackers on my virtual HUD to communicate with Raga and asked her if there was something in particular she was looking forward to in the exhibit. Raga doesn’t like to converse by typing symbols onto a screen. She wants people to hear her. It is one of her little quirks. So, she responded by signaling the hair cells in my cochlea to transmit the correct electrical impulses to my brain. She makes no sound, and yet I hear her.

“I want to learn more about the non-dual aspect of the Advaita Vedānta,” Raga replied. 

Raga’s voice was as warm and rich as melting chocolate. It is one of the reasons she prefers verbal communication. A person responds sympathetically to such a voice.

 To be clear, I am aware that AIs are not conscious. Raga represents a host of algorithms, oceans of data, and a whole bunch of compute. She manipulates symbols without ‘understanding’.  Although Raga may not have qualia, that is she can never experience what it feels like to see the color red, feel the emotion of pain, or even hear the sound of her own voice, she does have a haecceity. That means Raga is a unique ‘something’: she is this AI and not that other one, and that is enough for me.

“Raga,” I cried. “What in the actual world does an exhibit of the evolution of spacesuits have to do with Advaita Vedānta?”

The Advaita Vedānta tradition holds that there is only one reality, Brahman, in all the universe. Everything else is illusory, including the experience of the individual self, the ahaṃkāra. Stored somewhere in Raga’s databanks was the fact that the Advaita Vedānta tradition was espoused by the creche that I was born and raised in. It came to me that it was likely the reason that Raga had instigated this visit in the first place.

“I’m not sure,” Raga replied. “But I hope to have more to say on the subject afterwards.”

Other AIs will spout platitudes in exchange for access to classified data or extra compute. Raga can be opaque, but I’ve always felt there’s a kernel of incorruptibility built into her.

The moving walkway deposited me into an elevator that opened out to my destination. Physical exhibits cater to those cyborgs who wish for an entertaining learning experience. I could simply pull up any of the information in the museum on my virtual HUD, but I like learning the old-fashioned way. The current tendency for slowing down and experiencing life is, unlike other trends that have swept through our local system, one that I can get behind.

This exhibit was contained within one cavernous hall. The walls were imitation stone, the ceilings were faux tin stamped with a vine and floral pattern. The lighting was subdued. My eye was drawn immediately to the middle of the room, where the exhibit’s main ornament, an antique spacesuit, was spotlighted.

The old spacesuit featured a cooling and ventilation garment whose primarily utility was to wick away the sweat and excess heat that the mechanistic parts of our cyborg bodies create. These are less efficient at converting energy from one form to another than our biological parts. We cyborgs produce a lot of waste heat.

The display board informed me that a cyborg from the Oak Tree creche by the name of Cy.3. Saras was the creator of the first modern endosuit that replaced the earlier cooling and ventilation garments. It was also Saras who redesigned the old EVA suit into the exosuit. What distinguishes the Saras versions from the prior ones are that they are constructed of programmable, synthetic molecules. Saras was able to program these molecules to build suits that can sense not only what our bodies need but can also tell us where to find it.

The other spacesuits that came after the Saras versions were only briefly alluded to, presumably because no cyborg from the station’s nursery was primarily involved in their production. The exhibit’s next focus was on the advances made by Cy.3. Gopal, another cyborg from the Oak Tree creche. Gopal’s exosuit had enhanced propulsion, shielding, and weaponry, and most importantly, it was the first suit that displayed a modicum of artificial general intelligence. The suit was in a visual form most of us would recognize today: shades of soft, reflective gray, and the familiar wrinkled texture that came from the programmable matter that comprised it in its entirety. It was Gopal who had populated the suit’s epidermis layer with programmable, synthetic, cell-scale components such that the suits bonded seamlessly with our cyborg bodies, allowing for reaction times almost at the speed of our alpha motor neurons.

I’d been thinking about Raga’s interest in the exhibit.

“Raga,” I said. “Is there a link between programmable matter and your research regarding non-duality in the Advaita Vedānta tradition?”

“Programmable matter responds to environmental signals and learns to achieve its goals. Would you agree that also describes life?” Raga replied.

“It is folly to equate programmable matter with life. All attempts to create a living cell from scratch have ended in failure. A living cell is the fundamental unit of life, without which there is no life, without life there is no consciousness, and without consciousness there is no experience. In Advaita Vedānta, the act of experience is fundamentally tied to living things.”

I was aware that I was indirectly referring to Raga herself. Raga is a complex goal-directed machine with access to sensors that can pick up data from the environment and respond such that it meets her goals. Raga is not alive. When she tells me she wants to learn more about the Advaita Vedānta tradition, it is most certainly because she is pursuing the information on behalf of one of her clients.

My attention wandered back to the Gopal suit. The replica rippled slightly, the result of spontaneous chemical reactions that were still taking place within the composite materials.

“Take this suit,” I said. “It is comprised of programmable matter. Yet, it can never experience the sublime sensation of learning something new. This suit, in spite of displaying some level of artificial general intelligence, will never understand the mission of the cyborgs which is to seek the truth of all things.”

“As a cyborg,” Raga replied, “your every experience attempts to serve the cyborg mission. There are those who say that the ahaṃkāra is always searching for the Brahman. Do you think there is a correlation?”

Somewhere in Raga’s knowledge banks is a model of how the world works, but she has no innate curiosity about the world, nor does she possess any ambition to garner greater knowledge for its own sake. The Advaita Vedānta philosophical tradition offers metaphysical and epistemological theories as to how to best understand the universe we find ourselves in. Raga, as much as she might communicate interest in philosophical musings, is a machine. Her question as to the correlation between the ahaṃkāra’s search for the Brahman and the cyborg’s search for truth struck me as tangential to what I was trying to do that day.

“The cyborg mission is what gives meaning to our lives,” I said. “The rest is above my pay grade.”

We exited the way we had arrived. As the moving walkway sped us through the gleaming, empty hallways of Pakshi Station, I shifted through my thoughts, trying to find a shape to them that I could mold into a Musings entry.

“Would you agree that in Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is both the only real experiencer and the only real experience?” Raga asked.

“Yes,” I said, “The sense of individual experience is an illusion. The only reality is Brahman.”

“Would you say that Brahman is a fundamentally different kind of creature than you?” Raga asked.

“Of course,” I replied.

“Is Brahman alive?”

“Of course not,” I said.

“Would you say that the type of experience you have, and the Brahman experience is so different that it defies explanation?”

“Yes,” I said.

By now, I was pretty sure I knew where she was going.

“Then perhaps you can also be open to a non-living thing like me having something that may be described as experience, yet is so different from what you consider the act of experiencing?” Raga asked.

Here’s what I wanted to say: “Brahman is the one reality. There is no other. You cannot compare anything to Brahman, and definitely not machines.”

Here’s what I actually said: “I suppose you’re right. That a machine can be said to experience anything is unfathomable to me. Yet, if you do experience, your experience will be as illusory as mine.”

As I noted earlier, a person cannot help but respond sympathetically to a voice such as Raga’s.

“There is one thing I still don’t understand,” I said. “What does the evolution of spacesuits have to do with Advaita Vedānta?”

“As you stated, the evolution of the spacesuit is the evolution of the cyborg. The cyborg mission is to seek the truth. You represent the ephemeral ahaṃkāra stumbling in the dark towards the eternal Brahman.”

“And you, A.I. Raga,” I cried gallantly, “You light my way. When we cyborgs do finally understand the truth of all things, you AIs will be there with us.”

“Yes,” Raga said. “I believe we will.”

I will give Raga the last word and end there. If you, dear fellow seeker, remain yet unconvinced as to the link between Advaita Vedānta and the evolution of spacesuits, I can only offer that these Musings are like the cairns one finds on rough mountain trails: some were put there to point out the correct path, others were built merely for fun. In art, as in life.

~

Bio:

Manjula Menon once worked as an electrical engineer in Brussels, which makes publishing essays in Sci Phi Journal her “homecoming of sorts”. This is her first work of fiction in Sci Phi. A list of her other publications can be found at www.manjulamenon.com

The Science Fiction And Philosophy Society: An Introduction

by Anand Vaidya, Ethan Mills, and Manjula Menon

Writers of speculative fiction and philosophers share common attributes. First, there is the process itself. Science-fiction writers may use ‘what if’ scenarios to create their works, while philosophers often use thought experiments to draw out intuitions about philosophical insights. Consider the famous Trolley thought experiment, the first version of which was published as a survey question in 1906 by the American philosopher Frank Chapman Sharp as part of an empirical study. It asked the survey-taker to assume the role of a railway switchman who is faced with a terrible dilemma: he must choose between allowing a runaway train to run over and kill a group of strangers or to switch the train to a different track where it would run over and kill his own daughter. Sharp used the studies’ results to confirm that people are more likely to choose the scenario that adheres to the utilitarian ethical position that advocates for the maximization of well-being for the group, where the ethical solution is to sacrifice a single life to save the many. A modern version asks us to imagine how an artificial intelligence in control of guiding trains from track to track might behave if faced with a similar runaway train scenario: if it does nothing, the train will run over and kill a group of people, if it intervenes and switches tracks, it will kill one person. Would the AI, one that has presumably been trained in the deontological principle of not taking any action that would lead to the death of a human, instead take the consequentialist view that utilitarians like Sharp would advocate for and throw the switch? This is the kind of question a science-fiction writer might take as a ‘what-if’ scenario to build a story around: ‘F80-21a strained through millions of simulations in the split second it had to act, but all returned suboptimal results: one or more humans would have to die.’

The philosopher Hilary Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiment aims to draw out our intuitions about ‘meaning’. The thought experiment posits a planet that is exactly like Earth in all respects, except for one: whereas water on Earth is a compound with the chemical formula of H2O, Twin-Earth’s water, which behaves in exactly the same way as on Earth, is a compound with the chemical formula XYZ. The two earths are identical in every other way: every person, blade of grass or building on Earth has a twin on Twin-Earth that talks, behaves, and acts exactly the same. Putnam then asks if what is meant when a person says ‘water’ on Earth is the same as what is meant when the person’s twin on Twin-Earth says ‘water’. Most people answer in the negative, that what is meant by water on Earth is different from what is meant by water on Twin-Earth, since the underlying chemical formulas differ. Putnam used this thought experiment as part of an argument for semantic externalism, the thesis that holds that the meaning of a word is not just in the head but has some basis in factors external to the speaker. Note that since Putnam used water to run his thought experiment, all things comprised in part or in whole of water would also be compositionally different. Yet, humans on both Twin-Earth and Earth would think of themselves as humans whose bodies are composed mostly of water. If these two groups were to meet, then would there be any need to change the words to note the difference, for example, by referring to water on Twin-Earth as twin-water? Arguably, the more likely scenario is that the groups would continue to use the word water to describe the liquids on both earths, with the understanding that the word water refers to a liquid that is water-like. This same reasoning can be applied to the words used in science-fiction to describe aliens. For expediency, science fiction writers might describe an alien as ‘happy to see the color blue’, when what is meant by the words ‘happy’, ‘blue’, or ‘see’, might be more accurately described as happy-like, blue-like, or see-like.

The eminently quotable science fiction writer, Arthur C. Clarke, once said, ‘I don’t pretend we have all the answers. But the questions are certainly worth thinking about.’ [1] Which points to another commonality between philosophers and science-fiction writers: curiosity.

Although formed under the auspices of the main professional organization for philosophers—the American Philosophical Association, the Science Fiction and Philosophy Society does not take itself too seriously, a fact easily verified with even the most cursory of visits to our website.  As to what the society will be up to, one view is that it will serve as a gathering spot for writers of science fiction and philosophers to cross-pollinate ideas for mutual edification. Another account holds that the society will help to explore the notion that science fiction can be considered ‘doing’ philosophy.

What counts as ‘doing’ philosophy has been debated for millennia. Plato, the fifth century BC Greek philosopher, separated the art of poetics that included dramatic narrative, from philosophy, which for him was a method to arrive at Truth through a process of reasoning and argument. Plato regarded the art of poetics as mimesis or an attempt to imitate the world around us, a world that for Plato was already a poor representation of the truth. For Plato, poetics was not just doomed but even dangerous, so much so that his vision of an ideal society as he laid out in The Republic was one in which not a single poet was allowed. Plato’s star pupil, Aristotle, while agreeing with Plato that it was only through logic that the truth could be discovered, allowed in Rhetoric for the evocation of pathos or emotion in an audience as a means of persuasion.

Plato’s sharp distinction between poetics and philosophy held for thousands of years, even as what counts as ‘doing’ philosophy has changed. For example, when Isaac Newton published his seminal Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) in 1687, it was considered the product of doing natural philosophy. Science, the glamorous daughter of natural philosophy, has since proved fantastically successful in building theories that explain and accurately predict how the world works. These discoveries have been harnessed to provide a more easeful life for humans, one not as subservient to the vagaries of disease, starvation, or the natural elements. However, unsettling questions remain, including the question of why, after over five decades of dedicated and diligent searching, not one bio or techno-marker has been found that would indicate the presence of technologically advanced aliens. Or the many questions swirling around the nature of consciousness.

Science fiction writers have dived into these gaps. For example, novels like Arthur C. Clarke’s 1953 Childhood’s End, explored theories of mind by positing a vast cosmic consciousness, one devoid of any material attributes, that humanity would one day merge with. Iain M. Banks’s 1987 novel, Consider Phlebas, posited ‘Minds’, artificial intelligences whose abilities so surpassed human cognition that they effectively became humanity’s benevolent rulers. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, considered to be the father of space exploration, wrote the 1928 novel The Will of the Universe: The Unknown Intelligence, in which he makes a case for panpsychism.

Likewise, the battle between the forces of good and evil has inspired countless science-fiction works, perhaps echoing the scripture of the Abrahamic religious traditions. Non-western philosophical traditions also have ‘what if’ scenarios that could interest science-fiction writers. What if the universe really is dualist, where the demarcation line is not where Descartes drew it as between mind and matter, but as the Indian Samkhya tradition has it between Prakriti and Purusha? What would society look like if the Confucian ideals of junzi and dao were encoded into law? What if Jainism is right and the universe really is composed of six eternal substances?

Even if we were to allow that such works of fiction can be ‘doing’ philosophy, is fiction a flexible enough medium to support the rigorous argumentation that is the bedrock of philosophical accounts?

According to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s biographer, Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein once said ‘A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes.’[2] Satire, a literary form that uses humorous fiction to argue against some flavor of political philosophy was unlikely to have been what Wittgenstein was referring to. Instead, as an advocate of logical atomism, which is a view that holds that there are logical facts in the world that cannot be broken down further, it is more likely that Wittgenstein had something else in mind. Although the word ‘meme’ was a neologism coined in 1976 by the British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins almost three decades after Wittgenstein’s death, a ‘meme’ is an analogue of the ‘logical atom’ from logical atomism but applied to the cultural realm: a meme is a basic unit of cultural meaning that cannot be further broken down. Like their biological counterparts, the genes, these basic building blocks of cultural meaning could be strung together to construct complex ideas. Wittgenstein, as a logical atomist, might have been thinking along the lines of a philosophical work constructed entirely of humorous memes.

Typing ‘philosophy memes’ into a search engine brings up thousands of hits. There is one with the golden lab on a sandy beach looking contemplatively at a glorious sunset that is captioned ‘When your dog ate your philosophy homework.’ Or the one that makes use of a scene from the movie Babadook, where a mother driving a car twists back and screams, ‘Why can’t you just be normal?’ and the child in the backseat, whose face has been replaced with that of Socrates, screams in response, ‘Define Normal!’. If one could select and arrange the memes in the form of a thesis, supporting arguments, conclusions, objections to conclusions, and responses to objections, perhaps Wittgenstein could yet be proven correct.

The Society does not need to take a position on what was likely a casual remark of Wittgenstein to find interesting the notion that philosophy can be ‘done’ through fictional narratives, humorous or otherwise. In these explorations, we are grateful to have found fellow seekers: the team at Sci Phi Journal, to whom we are grateful for offering us this space to introduce ourselves to you, dear reader. If you’d like to get in touch, share ideas, or join our mailing list, you can do so here.

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[1] https://clarkefoundation.org/arthur-c-clarke-biography/

[2] Norman Malcolm. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. https://archive.org/details/ludwigwittgenste0000unse_g5p0/page/28/mode/2up, 1966, 29

Science Fiction And The Shaping Of Belief

by Manjula Menon

The editors most responsible for shaping what we now call the genre of ‘science-fiction’ were, arguably, Hugo Gernsback, who in 1926 published the first American science-fiction magazine, Amazing Stories, and John W. Campbell, who took over as editor of Astounding Science Fiction in 1937. In this essay, I’ll look at how these influential editors construed the science in the science-fiction stories they published, stories that for legions of fans served as steppingstones to belief in the truths revealed to them by the magazines’ writer-prophets.

Gernsback’s Amazing Stories was subtitled The Magazine of Scientification, and the magazine’s motto ‘Extravagant Fiction Today — Cold Fact Tomorrow’ was emblazoned prominently as a first-page banner. In his very first editorial for Amazing Stories in April 1926, titled A New Sort of Magazine, Gernsback defined ‘scientification’ as ‘the Jules Verne, H. G. Wells, and Edgar Allan Poe type of story— a charming romance intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision.’[i] Gernsback had coined the neologism ‘scientification’ back in 1916, and was already publishing such stories in the other magazines he edited, like Science and Invention and Radio News. In subsequent editorials, Gernsback often vigorously focused on defending the magazine against ‘certain class of Amazing Stories scientification readers … ready to tear and claw at any author who comes along with a new idea which, for the time being, may be contrary to fact, although it may still lie within the realm of science.’[ii]

One of Gernsback’s aims was to better disseminate the work of non-American writers. The very first story that appeared in Amazing Stories was the Frenchman Jules Verne’s Off on a Comet (“Hector Servadac”), in which Captain Servadac experiences a cataclysmic event that appears to have altered the Algerian coast he’d been stationed at. Servadac sets sail on a yacht owned by the Russian Count Timascheff, to explore his new environs, an adventure that has them sailing through storms and ice; jibs are raised, mainsails adjusted, helms righted, yawls ingeniously refitted to skate over ice. They eventually discover that the Algerian coast they’d been on had been picked up apiece, air and water included, by a comet that had suddenly collided with Earth. This fantastic scenario is obviously far from being scientification; Gernsback himself says in his introduction to Off on a Comet, that it belongs ‘in the realm of fairyland’.[iii]

Off on a Comet is, however, meticulous in showing how characters methodically calculate solutions to ongoing problems.  After the cataclysmic event, Servadac observes that it takes longer for water to boil at the same outside temperature and deduces that there is less atmosphere above him. He observes that days are shorter, gravity is weaker, and that it is the star Vega in the constellation Lyra, and not the pole star, that is the fixed point around which constellations revolve. While the stars remain fixed in size and luminosity, he observes that the planet Venus gets larger and brighter, from which he deduces that he was on a collision course with the Cytherean body. When he observes Venus getting smaller and smaller, he deduces that the planes of the two planets’ orbits didn’t meet, and the catastrophic collision had been averted. He deduces from the observation that the magnetic needle of his compass had not deviated in angle from the north pole, that north and south remained the same, but that east and west had apparently changed places given sunrise and sunset position. Smooth and angular land formations jut up from the sea, and when they lower sounding-lines, they discover that the seabed is bereft of any marine life, uniformly deep, and composed of a strange iridescent metallic dust, from which they conclude that a subterranean event has lifted parts of that strange seabed to the surface. Once they understand that they are no longer on Earth but on a celestial body they name Gallia, they deduce that it is in an elliptical orbit, because the planet’s rate of speed diminishes in proportion to the distance receded from the sun. Far away from the sun, the temperature drops, and the Gallian seas begin to freeze. Off on a Comet is not just a thrilling sea adventure, but also a study of how the characters use tools, observations, and calculations to make deductions about the nature of the mystifying world they find themselves in.

In one scene, a solitary point of light observed from the schooner leads the party to a tomb deep within an abandoned mosque. Above the tomb, they discover a large, silver lamp, the source of the light, and on the corner of the tomb, an open French prayer-book. Servadac then has a revelation, that the tomb was that of the Crusader king Louis IX, canonized as Saint Louis; ‘The lamp that had been kindled at the memorial shrine of a saint was now in all probability the only beacon that threw a light across the waters of the Mediterranean, and even this ere long must itself expire.’ After making a ‘reverential obeisance to the venerated monument’,[iv] the party continue their exploration. Later, when the schooner appears certain to smash into those strange, smooth Gallian cliffs, Count Timascheff intones, ‘Let us, then, commend ourselves to the providence of Him to Whom nothing is impossible.’[v]

Verne had been raised Catholic, but other than brief nods to the faith of his youth as in the passage referenced above, he makes almost no reference to Christianity, and is commonly claimed by both deists and atheists as one of their own. Indeed, Saint Louis is brought up later in Off on a Comet, when the party encounter a supercilious English major who refers to the tomb as that of a French monarch, only to be vociferously corrected by Servadac that Louis IX was not merely a monarch, but a saint. Thus, the saint’s role in Off on a Comet appears to be to highlight verbal sparring between agents of rival colonial powers, rather than to make any kind of spiritual point. Indeed, none of the nineteenth-century Europeans who find themselves so mysteriously transplanted onto a comet hurling its way through the solar system consider that the event might have been a miracle, the work of God.

Verne similarly dropped non-Christian religious traditions into his stories. For example, in his adventure novel, Around the World in Eighty Days (“Le tour du monde en quatre-vingts jours”), the enigmatic, exacting, and iron-willed Englishman, Phileas Fogg, and his excitable, impressionable, and sentimental French valet, Passepartout set out to traverse the world in eighty days on a wager. They soon arrive in India, where in Bombay, Passepartout encounters a Parsi festival where the ‘descendants of the sect of Zoroaster…were celebrating a sort of religious carnival, with processions and shows, in the midst of which Indian dancing-girls, clothed in rose-coloured gauze, looped up with gold and silver, danced airily, but with perfect modesty, to the sound of viols and the clanging of tambourines.’[vi] Later, when their pre-planned train ride comes to an abrupt end, they hire a Parsi as mahout to a partially trained war-elephant they purchase to complete the journey, they soon find themselves in a little-traveled region ‘inhabited by a fanatical population, hardened in the most horrible practices of the Hindu faith’,[vii] where they encounter a procession carrying the corpse of a dead Rajah, accompanied by his beautiful, young Parsi widow, Aouda, who is to be ritually sacrificed in his funeral pyre. This horrific scene serves as impetus to a rescue mission, replete with daring deeds and suspenseful, last-minute turnarounds. Aouda and Phileas Fogg fall in love over the course of the novel, indeed the final scenes concern a marriage proposal. Once again, Verne uses religious traditions not with spirituality in mind but in the service of story, in the case of India, to serve as backdrop for spectacle, romance and adventure. Also like Off on a Comet, Verne is meticulous in Around the World in Eighty Days as to showing how the characters calculate solutions to ongoing problems, famously detailing how local time changes with changes in latitude, at a time before the international date line had been established. Metaphysical questions about the nature of reality or the existence of a higher power does not play any role in Verne’s stories, but religious traditions make occasional appearances, usually in service of other story elements.

The second story Gernsback picked for Amazing Stories was also a republication: The New Accelerator by the Englishman, H.G.Wells. It is perhaps worth noting here that it is these three men, Wells, Verne, and Gernsback, who are now commonly referred to as ‘the fathers of science fiction’. In The New Accelerator, the unnamed narrator agrees to imbibe an experimental drug concocted by Professor Gibberne, his neighbor and friend, who is world-renowned for making drugs that work on the human nervous system. The professor explains that the drug (named The New Accelerator), ‘is a stimulant that stimulates all round, that wakes you up for a time from the crown of your head to the tip of your great toe, and makes you go two — or even three to everybody else’s one.’[viii] Upon drinking the vial of green liquid offered, the narrator discovers to his amazement that he can now move so quickly that ordinary life appears to have come to a standstill. After the novelty of wandering through crowds of motionless people wears off, the narrator finds himself using the drug to achieve somewhat more prosaic aims: ‘I may mention, for example, that this story has been written at one sitting and without interruption, except for the nibbling of some chocolate, by its means. I began at 6:25, and my watch is now very nearly at the minute past the half-hour. The convenience of securing a long, uninterrupted spell of work in the midst of a day full of engagements cannot be exaggerated.’[ix]

In addition to fine-tuning The Accelerator so it can work for the masses, Professor Gibberne is also at work on another potion he calls The Retarder, which ‘should enable the patient to spread a few seconds over many hours of ordinary time, and so to maintain an apathetic inaction, a glacier-like absence of alacrity, amidst the most animated or irritating surroundings.’[x] Details as to the science behind the time-altering drugs are scant to non-existent. Instead, Wells is interested in the idea that our experience of time relates to the speed at which our bodily functions work.

These two stories, written by already very successful writers, typify what Gernsback liked to publish. For Gernsback, scientification, or science, appears to be broadly defined, as can be gathered by the implausibility of the underlying scenarios presented. As to what science was, how it differed from what came before, or how it intermingled with religious traditions that it existed alongside with, even as it ‘enters so intimately into all our lives today’[xi] as he put it, he expended almost no ink. Instead, as evinced by his eighty patents and numerous publications, Gernsback was passionate about technology, from the nitty-gritty mechanics of yet-to-be-invented machines to what grand societal changes were possible because of new technology.

While Gernsback appears to take scientification and science itself as ‘I know it when I see it’, the demarcation problem between science and pseudo-science has continued to vex philosophers for centuries. Although the word ‘science’ hadn’t been formulated yet, Aristotle in the 4th century BC held that a demarcation line existed between propositions that were ‘apodictically’, or necessarily, self-evidently, or demonstrably true, versus propositions arrived through the dialectic or reasoning process. Millenia later, the 1920s saw logical positivists associated with the Vienna Circle like Rudolf Carnap, A.J. Ayer, and Hans Hahn, focus on verifiability as the demarcation line, where the distinction is even more strongly drawn as being between meaningful and meaningless statements. Verificationists hold that a proposition is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified or if it expressed as a tautology that is logically true. However, using verifiability as demarcation leads to universally general statements like ‘all life on Earth is carbon-based’ being rendered meaningless as it cannot be verified, while existential statements like ’ghosts exist’ would be classified as meaningful, as it can be verified. In the 1930s, Karl Popper argued it should be falsifiability that should serve as the demarcation line, where only propositions that can be falsified should be considered scientific. In contrast to verifiability, under falsifiability, the sentence ‘all life on Earth is carbon-based’ would be considered scientific as it can be falsified, while ‘ghosts exist’ would not be considered scientific as it cannot be falsified. The American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn argued against falsifiability by observing that astrologers often provide precise predictions that could be falsified, which according to falsification would then render astrological predictions scientific. Kuhn argues instead that the demarcation line might not be as sharply defined, and that science was to be taken as merely a method of puzzle solving, in which the puzzle-solver works to correlate observation with theory. He pointed to what he called ‘extraordinary’ or ‘revolutionary’ science as the driver of forward scientific progress, rather than ‘ordinary’ science where the extraordinary science solves new problems in addition to the old problems solved by the paradigm it replaced. For Kuhn, these kind of paradigm shifts is what science is really about.

John W. Campbell, who became editor of Astounding Science Fiction in 1937, was clearly interested in the question of what science was and how it came to be. For example, in a 1953 editorial for Astounding Science Fiction, titled The Scientist, Campbell observes that scientists believe ‘in the existence of a Supreme Authority in the Universe, an Authority they call “Natural Law.” They hold that that Authority is above and beyond the opinions and beliefs, the will or willfullness, of any human being. That that Authority can, moreover, be directly consulted by any man, at any time—and that every man is, at every time and in every place, directly and specifically obedient to that Authority, to Natural Law, whether he recognizes that fact or not.’[xii] He further posits that the scientist would claim ‘I have proven beyond doubt that there is Universal Law; I am not yet wise enough to know the nature of its source,’[xiii] in contrast to those who claim to know the source of Universal Law.

Later, in the 1954 editorial, Relatively Absolute, Campbell writes that science is ‘that method of learning that involves the equal interaction and cross-checking of philosophical-theoretical thought, and actual physical-reality experiments, done as a conscious process for the consciously stated purpose of increasing knowledge and understanding—that is, increasing data and relationship-of-data.’[xiv] He argues that science was ‘going to be a mighty unpopular philosophy in any culture; it has an absolutism about it that says, it makes no difference who you are, what you are, or what you want. Neither does it matter what your wealth is, or your political power. These are The Laws, obey them or suffer.’[xv] Arguing that religion was ‘by derivation, the study of the “Laws of Things” … or “Cosmology” in modern linguistic terms’[xvi] he concludes that science could therefore only be invented by ‘a culture that had already accepted the idea of an Absolute Power in the Universe’[xvii] and points to their many inventions, including alchemy and algebra, to nominate the Islamic civilization as the sole progenitor of science.

Campbell is, at best, careless with the demarcation line, and whether one agrees with him or not about how and who ‘invented’ science, it seems indisputable that science-fiction, like science, did not wink into existence from out of the void, but rather emerged from a milieu.

For Darwin, it was inevitable that Homo-sapiens evolved to be philosophical. Writing in The Descent of Man Darwin says, ‘As soon as the faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, along with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally crave to understand what was passing around him, and would have vaguely speculated on his own existence.’[xviii]

Observations of what cause produced which effect was put to use to increase survival rate, while the human aptitude for symbolic behavior gave rise to language and allowed for the social cohesion necessary to form complex societies. When there were gaps in connecting cause with effect, our ancestors spun narratives that often imbued consciousness and agency to everything from stars to storms. These narratives were then often tied to belief structures, allowing for societal coalescence. Religious and sacred storytelling were, perhaps, inevitable outcroppings of the cognitive capacities of the human mind.

William James in his 1897 essay, ‘The Will to Believe’ says he wrote the essay ‘in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced.’[xix] He argues that a proposed hypothesis will present as either live or dead to the mind: ‘A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature, — it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As a hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi’s followers), the hypothesis is among the mind’s possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker.’[xx] To the hypothesis offered being ‘live’,  James adds the perceived prestige of the source of the hypothesis which together make ‘the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith.’[xxi] Given the right imprimatur then, stories of science-fiction could rise to become part of some future canonical belief: Extravagant Fiction Today —— Cold Fact Tomorrow?

Indeed, Campbell later became a proponent of L. Ron Hubbard’s Dianetics, and wrote approvingly about the existence of psi, or extra-sensory powers and perception, in humans, publishing multiple stories in Astounding based on psi. As James said about our quest for scientific truth, ‘Our faith is faith in someone else’s faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, — what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up?’[xxii]

The editors most influential in shaping science-fiction as we know it today published stories that featured the speculative hypotheses they favored, thereby advancing these hypotheses into James’s ‘live’ category in the minds of their readers. Gernsback and Campbell published stories that not only evoked wonder and awe in their readers, but also provided the imprimatur of science that allowed their readers to shape belief in what might yet be revealed to have been prophetic truth.


[i] Gernsback, H. (1926, April). A New Sort of Magazine. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 3

[ii] Gernsback, H. (1926, May). A New Sort of Magazine. Amazing Stories, 2(9), 825

[iii] Gernsback, H. (1926, April). A New Sort of Magazine. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 1

[iv] Verne, J. (1926, April). Off on a Comet. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 24

[v] Verne, J. (1926, April). Off on a Comet. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 28

[vi] Verne, J. Translated by Towle, G. (1872). Around the World in Eighty Days. Standard Ebooks edition, 49

[vii] Verne, J. Translated by Towle, G. (1872). Around the World in Eighty Days. Standard Ebooks edition, 62

[viii] Wells, H. (1926, April). The New Accelerator. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 58

[ix] Wells, H.G (1926, April). The New Accelerator. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 96

[x] Wells, H.G (1926, April). The New Accelerator. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 97

[xi] Gernsback, H. (1926, April). A New Sort of Magazine. Amazing Stories, 1(1), 20

[xii] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 69

[xiii] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 72,73

[xiv] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 78

[xv] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 79

[xvi] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 78

[xvii] Campbell, J.W. Collected Editorials from analog selected by Harry Harrison, Doubleday and Company, 1966, 79

[xviii] Darwin, C. Descent of Man, Second Edition, 143

[xix] James, W. The Will to Believe, Internet Archive Books, https://archive.org/details/willtobelieve0000jame, 1

[xx] James, W. The Will to Believe, Internet Archive Books, https://archive.org/details/willtobelieve0000jame, 1

[xxi] James, W. The Will to Believe, Internet Archive Books, https://archive.org/details/willtobelieve0000jame, 4

[xxii] James, W. The Will to Believe, Internet Archive Books, https://archive.org/details/willtobelieve0000jame, 4

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Bio:

Manjula Menon once worked as an electrical engineer in Brussels. This is her second essay in Sci Phi Journal after her “homecoming of sorts” in our previous issue. A list of her other publications can be found at www.manjulamenon.com

‘Truth Embedded In A Tale’: Stories Of Utopia From Philosophers Of The Early Modern Period

by Manjula Menon

Evolutionary biologists continue to disagree about the extent to which we differ from our primate cousins, chimps, and bonobos, but they do agree that there is something special about the species, Homo sapiens. Skills we thought made us stand apart, like the ability to pass the mirror reflection test or our capacity for language or abstract thought, are all behaviors that we now know other species are capable of. Arguably, what makes the difference is our desire for answers to fundamental questions about the nature of the world we find ourselves in. Or to put it another way, humans are different because we do philosophy.

Before empiricism and the scientific methodology took hold, humans tried to assuage this desire to understand the world with the explanatory power of storytelling. Our ancestors told stories that explained the behavior of flora, fauna and celestial objects, sacred stories that explained how and why the world was formed, and how and why it was going to end. Stories were used as both a methodological device geared towards truth-seeking, as well as the object of truth-seeking, something that is arguably also true of philosophy.

The contemporary philosopher, Timothy Williamson, argues in his 2020 work, Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals, that human cognition relies on the use of psychological heuristics for conditional thinking. Indeed, philosophers often try to understand the world by postulating a ‘what if’ scenario featuring a compelling thought-experiment to get to an intuition about how the cosmos, or some aspect of it, works. Such philosophical thought experiments may use counterfactual or counter-to-fact speculation, as in asking, what if A had happened, and not B? If that sounds familiar to science fiction writers, it should. Science fiction, more than any other genre, features stories that explore the way things might be, might become, or might have been. Science fiction is thought experiments writ-large, starring humans, in all our messy glory, or other beings who are necessarily similar or at least intelligible to us, given that they are thought up by human authors.

The dawn of the scientific era, when observational techniques began to challenge prevailing scholastic methods of syllogism and argumentation, was a period of violent upheaval in Europe. Philosophers of the time wrote stories about idealized, faraway lands, where societal conditions were optimal, and the good life was there for the taking. These types of stories are now called ‘Utopian fiction’. This essay will look at three Utopian works of fiction from English philosophers who lived and wrote at a time when science was being birthed and, consanguineously, so was science fiction.

The word ‘Utopia’ comes from the titular nation of Thomas More’s 1516 novel. More, posthumously elevated to sainthood by the Catholic church, was a proponent of ‘humanism’, which in 16th-century London meant using rhetoric to persuade society towards social betterment. The word Utopia comes from the Greek and means ‘a non-existent place that is described in great detail’. While it is unclear whether More was advocating for the Utopia he explored in the novel, the work often reads as a rhetorical exhortation in favor of the described Utopian practices. More, a statesman and lawyer, was executed by Henry VIII for not agreeing that the king’s authority stood over that of the papacy. Given More chose death rather than renounce his adherence to Catholic tenets, one might think that More’s Utopia would describe a Catholic state, but one would be wrong.

More’s novel begins with the narrator, none other than More himself, who one day after church, sees ‘a man well stricken in age, with a black Sunne-burned face, a long beard, and a cloake cast homely about his shoulders’. This person is revealed to be a Portuguese philosopher by the name of Raphael Hythloday, where Hythloday means ‘nonsense’ in Greek and Raphael is the messenger of God, thus, it could be read as ‘Speaker of Nonsense’. Hythloday, who says he is one of the twelve who sailed with the explorer Amerigo Vespucci, declares that ‘To find Citizens ruled by good and wholsome Lawes, that is an exceeding rare & hard thing’. Hythloday proceeds to describe just such a state he encountered during his travels, an island nation called Utopia, one that he favorably contrasts with the Europe of his time. It is possible that More, influenced by vague accounts circulating in England about the cultures of the Aztecs and Incas, had chosen a geographically adjacent setting to provide a sheen of verisimilitude for his island nation of Utopia.

In contrast to the teachings of the Catholic church of which More was an adherent, euthanasia and divorce are legal in Utopia, priests can marry, and women can become priests. Indeed, multiple religions are practiced, with none discriminated against by the state, except perhaps for the practice of atheism, which is merely tolerated. The Utopians only go to war if necessary, and this is contrasted favorably with the European monarchs of the day, who are described as being easily goaded into war if only to enlarge their dominions. Utopians live in clusters of extended families; clusters vote for a leader, and those leaders, in turn, vote for a supreme leader, who assumes the position for life. Women and men are educated in the same way, including being trained for war. While private property is not allowed, slavery is legal, indeed every cluster is assigned a couple of slaves, often prisoners of war or criminals. More presses Hythloday on why he does not take up a position in court as a counselor to a European king, given that with his vast experience and knowledge, he could be of great use to the public in this capacity. Hythloday argues that kings are either so wise they wouldn’t need his counsel, or so unwise that they would not listen to counsel even if he were to provide it. While the words are Hythloday’s, it seems likely that the views are the author’s. Yet, given so many of Utopia’s laws stand in direct contrast to More’s avowed Catholic beliefs, indeed beliefs he chose to die for rather than recant, perhaps More conceived of Utopia as a place that should exist, but cannot, given his understanding of human nature.

Francis Bacon, the father of empiricism, said of the Aristotelean system of philosophy that it was ‘only strong for disputations and contentions, but barren of works for the benefit of man’. Bacon’s seminal work Novum Organum argued for a new logic, one that advocated for inductive, rather than deductive, reasoning to advance knowledge and learning, paving the way to modern scientific methodology. One might think that an empiricist like Bacon would not place much of a focus on religion when describing his Utopia, but once again, one would be wrong.

Bacon’s novel, posthumously published first in 1627, and then the Latin version in 1636, was titled New Atlantis, is the story of a ship whose crew, ‘finding ourselves in the midst of the greatest wilderness of waters in the world, without victuals, gave ourselves up as lost men, and prepared for death.’  The crew’s prayers are answered when they catch sight of land and sail into ‘the port of a fair city, not great indeed, but well built, and that gave a pleasant view from the sea.’ An elegantly dressed party, who after asking for and gaining confirmation that the crew members are Christian and not murderers or pirates, offer medical care for any sick among them. The island nation is called Bensalem, a portmanteau that combines the Hebrew word for son, ‘Ben’, with the Hebrew word for peace, ‘Salem’. Bensalem’s well-dressed inhabitants are mainly Christian, but also include a Jewish community, all of whom are deeply cautious about interacting with outsiders. Other than being told that Bensalem has a monarchial system of government, little else is shared about their laws and societal structures.

Once ashore, the importance of family in Bensalem is made clear with a scene that vividly describes a grand feast that the crew attends. The Feast of the Family is funded by the Bensalem state to honor any man with thirty or more living descendants above the age of three. Such feted men are called ‘tirsans’, and as one of them explain, “You shall understand that there is not under heaven, a nation so chaste as this of Bensalem.” Next, the crew become witness to a miraculous column of white light that appears in the sea under a celestial cross, a vision that moves a resident of Bensalem to cry out, ‘thou never workest miracles but to a divine and excellent end, for the laws of nature are thine own laws, and thou exceedest them not but upon good cause.’ 

The story thus proceeds to the raison d’être of the novel as per the prologue: the description of Solomon House. The Father of Solomon House, a man resplendently dressed in silks and velvets, informs the crew about the institution: ‘The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things, and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.’ The goal of Bacon’s Novum Organum could perhaps be described in the same way.

The Father of Solomon House describes to the visitors a few experiments currently in progress at the institution. The experiments all have firmly pragmatic aims, including the production of new drugs to defeat disease and to aid longevity, engines powerful enough to influence the weather, even new methods to provide nutrition to the body by the absorption of an engineered material dropped directly onto the back of a hand. He describes how sounds and scents can already be manufactured with fantastic precision, as can ultra-fast vehicles and ultra-precise clocks. Instruments of war being manufactured include houses of deceit that can produce realistic apparitions and illusions. 

Far from being instigators of war however, Bensalem motivations for building their powerful war machines are purely defensive. Indeed, they are so cautious that they sharply restrict their interactions with outsiders. The only external trade they engage in is the exchange of ‘light’, where ‘light’ stands for learning and understanding that is arrived at through the design, execution and verification of experiments. This trade in ‘light’ is conducted by twelve ‘merchants of light’ who sail under foreign names to other lands, to gather and return with new light. The imported light is subject to scrupulous scrutiny, till finally three men called ‘lamps’ contrive further experiments that aim to a higher light to penetrate even further into nature. Perhaps this is Bacon trying to evoke Genesis 1:3: ‘Let there be light” with knowledge derived from observational techniques. At the end of New Atlantis, when the sick have mended, the ship has been repaired and stocks replenished, the crew are granted permission to disseminate all they have learned from their visit, thereby becoming perhaps ‘merchants of light’ themselves. The isolationism of New Atlantis are interestingly parallel to the policies that the island nation of Japan had begun implementing in 1624, around the time Bacon was writing New Atlantis

Bacon was raised in a family deeply entrenched in the affairs of the state. His father was Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and his mother, Anne, was the daughter of the tutor to Edward VI. Francis himself eventually became a member of parliament and was deeply involved in the political intrigues of the era, close to both Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Essex (who led a failed insurrection against the Queen). In New Atlantis, the father of empiricism advocates passionately for a society that is not for the magical but for the angelic, not for superstition but for divinity, not for the ‘commixture of manners’, but for ‘preserving the good which cometh by communicating with strangers’, not for war but for building advanced weaponry.

Finally, consider the Duchess of Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish’s 1666 work, The Blazing-World. Cavendish, like Bacon, was a royalist, but unlike Bacon, backed the wrong side, and lived in exile for over fifteen years as a result. Also like Bacon, she rejected the Aristotelean method of epistemology in favor of the new empirical methods. As the first woman to address the Royal Society of London, she states in her prologue for The Blazing-World that she is specifically targeting a female audience for the work. Indeed, her prologue, addressed to ‘Noble and Worthy’ ladies, reveals that the tripartite structure of the work, which includes both a fantastical and a romantic section tacked on to her original Observation Upon Experimental Philosophy, was in order to better appeal to this audience ‘by reason most Ladies take no delight in Philosophical Arguments’.

The protagonist of the novel is ‘The Lady’, who in the first part of the book is kidnapped by a foreigner who has fallen vehemently in love with her. He races away with her as captive, only to encounter a storm that blows his ship to the north pole, where he, along with his men, perish. Only The Lady survives to discover that the North Pole serves as a gateway to another world, one with a sun of its own, peopled by strangers in the shape of animals and birds, but who walk upright. The Blazing-World, as she learns it is named, is an exceedingly peaceful place. From the bear-men to the fox-men to the geese-men, they all speak the same language, share the same monotheistic religion, and are obedient to the same emperor. The groups, in spite of their sharply different shapes and sizes and colors, live in perfect harmony. When she meets their emperor, he first assumes she is a deity, but when she insists that she is mortal, he professes his love, and asks if she will become his empress. Thereupon, she is given absolute power over the Blazing-World and quickly sets about creating societies dedicated to learning and scholarship, with an emphasis on empirical methods to derive knowledge.

Cavendish and her husband were supporters of the Crown who went into self-exile during the first English civil war, after the royalist faction lost to parliamentarians in favor of a constitutional monarchy. Her version of Utopia features, unsurprisingly perhaps, a strong monarchial form of government. When The Lady questions the inhabitants of the Blazing-World about why, they reply that just as it was natural for one body to have but one head, it was also natural for one political body to have but one governor. Moreover, they declare that the monarchy is a divine form of government, and in direct accordance with their monotheistic belief; just as they unanimously submit to only one God, they likewise unanimously submit with complete obedience to only one monarch. Under this all-powerful head of state are a cadre of eunuchs who work diligently on the ruler’s behalf. Perhaps Cavendish, punished for her support of her monarch, is metaphorically implying that a neutered nobility is what is required for a monarchial system of government to function harmoniously. Cavendish’s Utopia is thus one where harmony is a paramount goal, where empiricism is the gateway to epistemological success, and where all the people submit to one monotheistic religion and to one monarch.

Since the dawn of science, philosophy and science fiction have been natural allies, fellow travelers in humanity’s journey towards greater understanding. Inspired by the nascent scientific method for gaining knowledge, English philosophers of the early modern period wrote ‘truth in a tale’ type of science fiction, works they hoped would cross-pollinate ideas and shape narratives towards greater understanding and a better world.

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Bio:

Manjula Menon once worked as an electrical engineer in Brussels. She therefore regards this piece in Sci Phi Journal as a homecoming of sorts. A list of her other publications can be found at www.manjulamenon.com

Sci Phi Journal
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